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INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: DOMESTIC
BARRIERS TO UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN
THE ROME CONVENTION ON NEIGHBORING
RIGHTS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The majority of the world's non-socialist countries recognize a
performer's right to receive royalties from radio and television
broadcasts of the performer's sound recordings.' This performers'
right, also called a "neighboring right" because it involves phono-
grams, performances, and broadcasts of copyrighted works, 2 is ex-
tended in those countries to protect featured performers, accompa-
nying orchestral musicians, and producers.8 Performers' rights are
not recognized in the United States.' Instead, the United States
grants royalty rights only to the owner of the copyright, which
precludes a non-owning performer from sharing in broadcast
revenues.
The United States position on neighboring rights has prevented
its participation in the International Convention for the Protection
of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organi-
*This Note is a derivative of a prizewinning entry in the 1982 Nathan Burkan Memorial
Competition (sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
(ASCAP)) at the University of Georgia entitled Performers' Rights in Sound Recordings:
The American Tug of War.
See generally 1-3 UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (Supp. 1978)
(a three volume compilation of all domestic copyright laws of the countries of the world es
well as major multilateral conventions). As many as fifty-eight countries now recognize per-
formers' rights in sound recordings. See Commercial Use of Sound Recordings Amendment:
Hearings on H.R. 1805 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Adminis-
tration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1981)
(statement of Stanley M. Gortikov).
I See Ulmer, The Rome Convention for the Protection of Performances, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Part II, 10 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 165, 165
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Ulmer II].
• See generally Oler, Performance Rights in Foreign Countries, reprinted in SUBCOMM.
ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICI-
ARY, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PERFORMANCE RIGHTS IN SOUND RECORDINGS 178, 259-329
(Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter cited as COMMrrRE PRINT].
' See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1976) (scope of exclusive rights in sound recordings).
5 The "copyright owner" is to receive royalties for phonorecords made and distributed
after being identified in the registration or other public records of the United States Copy-
right Office. 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
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zations (Rome Convention),' under which artists of member coun-
tries receive royalties from broadcasts of their works in other mem-
ber countries.7 The absence of United States membership deprives
the world's recording artists of a great amount of potential revenue
in the United States, as well as domestic artists' potential income
from foreign airplay.8 The current recession in the music industry9
has adversely affected the performers' revenues from record sales
worldwide; 0 though broadcasts of those records continue in the
United States, the vast majority of performing artists receive noth-
ing from the enjoyment they bring to the American public through
this airplay."
This Note deals with the issue of neighboring rights in the
United States and the impact that the resolution of that issue will
have on international copyright status in the United States. The
Note focuses on section 114(d) of title 17 of the United States
Code12 (hereinafter Copyright Act), which, when revised in 1976,
mandated a resolution of the performers' rights issue by 1978.1s
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms
and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43, reprinted in 3 UNESCO,
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Rome Con-
vention]. The Rome Convention, also referred to as the "Neighboring Rights Convention,"
currently has twenty-three members. They are Austria, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Congo,
Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Paraguay, Sweden,
United Kingdom and Uruguay. See 18 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REv. WORLD INTELL. PROP. OR-
GANIZATION (WIPO) 13 (1982).
* See Rome Convention, supra note 6, art. 12.
* It has been estimated that American performers could receive over $13 million in an-
nual foreign income in addition to an equal amount in revenue from United States airplay.
See Performance Rights Amendment of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 180 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Danielson Amendment Hearings].
" See, e.g., STANDARD AND POOR'S INDUSTRY SURVEYs L-32 (Jan. 1982); Radio Stations in
U.S. down 33.6% in Pre-Tax Profits for 1980, BILLBOARD, Feb. 13, 1982, at 4. The recession
is not limited to the United States. See, e.g., French Sales Growth in Doubt: Phonogram
President Cites Freeze on Prices, Wages, BILLBOARD, Oct. 9, 1982, at 53; U.K. LP, Tape
Deliveries Dive, BILLBOARD, Dec. 4, 1982, at 9.
10 A major cause of the decline in worldwide record sales is home taping and record
piracy. See STANDARD AND POOR'S INDUSTRY SURVEYS, supra note 9, at L-34; Aussies Renew
Tape Debate, BILLBOARD, Aug. 7, 1982, at 1, 58. For a discussion of the international ramifi-
cations of record piracy, see Note, Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings: Trans-
national Problem in Search of a Solution, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 399 (1981).
" See infra note 13.
11 17 U.S.C. § 114(d) (Supp. V 1981).
" The current United States Copyright Act does not resolve the performers' rights issue.
Instead, it defers the resolution of the issue until January 3, 1978. At present, the statute
reads:
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The prospects of Rome Convention membership for the United
States, when the long-overdue resolution is completed, will be ex-
amined in light of post-1976 domestic proposals and models from
foreign countries. Finally, possible solutions will be proposed which
would meet the minimum requirements of the Rome Convention
and yet possibly satisfy the factions in the United States which
oppose the recognition of neighboring rights.
II. INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF
UNITED STATES NON-CONFORMITY
The foundation for all European copyright law was the English
Statute of Anne," which, in 1710, gave the author of a literary
work the exclusive right to make copies of that work for a twenty-
one year period.1 5 The statute, which was premised upon formali-
ties of notice and deposit," was the first copyright legislation,17
and was used as a model for European legislation in Denmark
(1741) and France (1793)."e
The United States also used the Statute of Anne as a copyright
On January 3, 1978, the Register of Copyrights, after consulting with represent-
atives of owners of copyrighted materials, representatives of the broadcasting, re-
cording, motion picture, entertainment industries, and arts organizations, repre-
sentatives of organized labor and performers of copyrighted materials, shall
submit to the Congress a report setting forth recommendations as to whether this
section should be amended to provide for performers and copyright owners of
copyrighted material any performance rights in such material. The report should
describe the status of such rights in foreign countries, the views of major inter-
ested parties, and specific legislative or other recommendations, if any.
Id. Though the report was submitted, no action has been taken to resolve the performers'
rights issue.
" Statute of Anne, 8 Anne c. 19 (1710).
,1 Id. Works already in existance at the time of the passage of the statute were given
protection for 14 years.
,s Protection was conditioned upon the author affixing a notice to the work indicating
that the work was his creation, and the deposit of the work into certain British libraries. See
A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW, HowaLL's COPYRIGHT LAW REVISED AND THE 1976 ACT 3
(5th ed. 1979).
11 E. PLOMAN & L. HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT 12 (1980), citing P. RECHT, LE DROrr D'AUTEUR:
UNE NOUVELLE FORME DE PROPRIgT* 22 (1969). Prior to this time there was limited judicial
recognition of international protection of authors' rights in other European countries. Pro-
tection was granted in France as early as 1579, but only if the foreigner's work was pub-
lished within that country. In Germany, A Decree of the Electors of Saxony, dated February
28, 1686, gave foreign publications protection equivalent to national publications. 1 S.
LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY § 6, at 16
(1938).
" 1 S. LADAs, supra note 17, § 7, at 18-19.
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law model."' The United States Constitution authorized Congress
to "promote the progress of science and the useful arts by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries. "20 Early United States
enactments granted protection solely to United States citizens,2 '
and were premised on copyright being a limited economic monop-
oly granted to authors and composers followed by a free use of the
composition by the general public."2
European nations, which viewed copyright as an author's right
or moral right rather than an economic property right, 3 began to
grant international protection through bilateral agreements during
the early nineteenth century.24 These agreements were premised
upon national treatment, under which holders of copyright were to
be treated in a member country as if they were nationals of that
country. 5 The United States was unable to participate in these
reciprocity arrangements because the United States copyright laws
only protected United States citizens.2 6
In 1896, nine European nations joined in the first international
copyright convention, the Berne Convention,7 which established
the Berne Union. The Berne Convention was premised upon the
idea of national treatment and abolished the formalities of notice
Is A. LATMAN, supra note 16, at 5. For the full statutes of the former colonies under the
Articles of Confederation, see COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT OFFICE BULL. 1o. 3 COPYRIGHT
ENACTMENTS: LAWS PASSED IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1783 RELATING TO COPYRIGHT 1-21
(1963).
SO U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
"I See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124; Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4
Stat. 436.
22 E. PLOMAN & L. HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 16.
"' "It has become traditional to differentiate between the European and American philos-
ophy of copyright by alleging that Europeans think that copyright is an inherent or natural
right of the individual author, and that Americans think that copyright is a monopoly
granted to stimulate artistic creation." A. BOGSCH, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT UNDER THE UNI-
VERSAL CONVENTION 3 (1968); see also 1 S. LADAS, supra note 17, §§ 1-5, at 1-12.
", The earliest international agreements in the field of copyright were a series of 32 bilat-
eral agreements between Prussia and other German states enacted between 1827 and 1829.
The main premise in these, as well as later bilateral agreements, was that a copyright would
be recognized by one of the parties if it originated in the territory of the other party. M.
BOGUSLAVSKY, COPYRIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LIT-
ERARY AND SCIENTIFIC WORKS 54 (1973).
25 Id.
" See generally 1 S. LADAS, supra note 17, § 19, at 49-50 (listing all international bilat-
eral agreements in force in 1886).
" The Berne Convention For the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, revised at
Brussels, June 26, 1948, 331 U.N.T.S. 218, reprinted in 3 UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND
TREATIES OF THE WORLD (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Berne Convention].
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and deposit, except for formalities required by the author's coun-
try of origin.2" By this time the United States had granted protec-
tion to non-citizens;29 however, it was precluded from Berne Con-
vention membership because of rigid United States formalities of
entry of title, notice, deposit, and United States manufacture.30
In 1908, the Berne Union met at Berlin to revise the earlier
text.3' The revised text included a provision granting musical com-
posers the right to authorize the mechanical adaptation and public
execution of their works.3 2 Thus, the Berlin revision recognized a
composer's right in sound recordings, 3 and foreshadowed the
emergence of "mechanical adaptation" as an important element
deserving copyright protection.
The United States Copyright Act of 1909"1 fell short of meeting
the requirements for Berne Convention membership because of
continued United States insistence on traditional statutory formal-
ities.31 Despite legislative attempts to conform United States copy-
right laws to the Berne Convention during the early twentieth cen-
tury, 6 the United States was unable to join the Berne Union.3 7
United States membership was further precluded by the 1928
Rome Conference, in which the Berne Union granted a "moral
1 S. LADAS, supra note 17, § 38, at 83-84.
" See Copyright Act of 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106.
30 A. LATMAN, supra note 16, at 7. The manufacturing clause linked United States copy-
right protection to the "manufacture" of copies in the United States; this prohibited general
importation of foreign-manufactured copies. Id. at 266.
" 1 S. LADAS, supra note 17, § 40, at 92-94.
32 Id.
33 Id.
" Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (amended 1976) [hereinafter cited as Copy-
right Act of 1909].
" A. LATMAN, supra note 16, at 10. The Act of 1909 did advance an important interna-
tional aspect of United States copyright law by exempting books of foreign origin in foreign
languages from the requirement of being reprinted in the United States. See Copyright Act
of 1909, supra note 34, § 16, 35 Stat. at 1079.
" Revisions during this period included the easing of the requirements of the deposit of
works by foreign authors published abroad (Copyright Act of 1914, ch. 47, 38 Stat. 311), and
a partial elimination of the manufacturing clause (Copyright Act of 1926, c. 743, 44 Stat.
818).
37 Citizens of the United States still were able to take advantage of the Berne Conven-
tion's provisions in an indirect way. Under article 6(1) of the Berne Convention, authors
who were not nationals could obtain Berne protection if their works were first published in a
member country. This led United States publishers to publish works simultaneously in both
the United States and Canada (a former Berne Union Member), and thus, obtain the bene-
fits of Berne Convention protection witholit Berne Convention obligations. A. HANSON, OM-
Nms CoPRmIGr REviSION 11 (1973).
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right" to authors3 8 and gave musical composers the exclusive right
to authorize public radio broadcasts of their works.39
After World War II, the United States led a new movement to-
ward a second multilateral international copyright convention
based upon a conciliation of the principles of the Berne Conven-
tion and United States copyright law.40 This approach resulted in
the Universal Copyright Convention,'4 1 which offered less protec-
tion to the artist than the Berne Convention. 2 The United States
ratification of the Universal Copyright Convention ended a long
history of non-participation in international copyright conventions;
however, the United States denial of moral rights to authors and
performers was to serve as a barrier to its further international co-
operation in the area of neighboring rights.'3
" Berne Convention, supra note 27, art. 6. This "moral right," which sharply contrasted
with the philosophy in the United States of copyright being an economic monopoly, gave
the author the "right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, muti-
lation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work,
which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation." For a thorough treatment of the
"moral right" concept, see Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. Comp. L. 506
(1955); Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and American Copyright Law-A Proposal, 24
So. CAL. L. REv. 375 (1951); and Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law
of Artists, Authors, and Creators, 53 HARv. L. REv. 554 (1940). One writer has suggested
that the non-recognition of moral rights by the United States is not necessarily a bar to
Berne Convention accession. See Gabay, The United States Copyright System and the
Berne Convention, 26 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 202, 216 (1978).
" Berne Convention, supra note 27, art. 6.
4 A. LATMAN, supra note 16, at 10.
"' Universal Copyright Convention, ratified Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No.
3324, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868. For a
summary of the efforts by non-Berne Union countries to draft the Universal Copyright Con-
vention to ensure United States participation, see Wells, The Universal Copyright Conven-
tion and the United States: A Study of Conflict and Compromise, 8 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
(ASCAP) 69, 86-88 (1957).
" Compare Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 41, art. IV(2)(a), 25 U.S.T. at
1347 (minimum duration of protection is life of author plus 25 years) with Berne Conven-
tion, supra note 27, art. 7 (minimum duration of protection is life of author plus 50 years);
compare Universal Copyright Convention, art. III(1), 25 U.S.T. at 1345-46 (notice is neces-
sary for protection) with Berne Convention, art. 18 (notice and deposit are not necessary for
protection); compare Universal Copyright Convention (no provisions on moral rights) with
Berne Convention, art. 6 (moral rights expressly recognized). See generally Note, Abandon
Restrictions, All Ye Who Enter Here!: The New United States Copyright Law and the
Berne Convention, 9 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 455, 460 (1977); McConnell, The Effect of
the Universal Copyright Convention on other International Conventions and Arrange-
ments, 9 COPYRIGHT L. Symn. (ASCAP) 32, 61 (1958).
4 See generally Katz, Legislative History of Performance Rights in Sound Recordings,
reprinted in CoMMrr PINr, supra note 3, at 28-58.
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III. NEIGHBORING RIGHTS IN SOUND RECORDINGS
A. The Rome Convention of 1961
In the decade following the Berne Convention's recognition of
moral rights for authors, many European countries granted protec-
tion to performers by multilateral agreements."" The group initiat-
ing a movement towards a multilateral convention was the Interna-
tional Institute for Unification of Private Law, which attempted to
draft initial proposals on performers' rights at a meeting in
Samaden, Switzerland in 1939.46 World War II interrupted the
work of the Institute, but a new meeting was called in Brussels in
1948.4' The Brussels Conference sparked the proposals of the 1951
Rome Draft, a product of European experts,4 7 which lay dormant
from 1951 until 1960.
In 1960, representatives from UNESCO, the Berne Union, and
the International Labor Organization produced the Hague Draft,
which was to form the basis for the Rome Convention of 1961.48
Both the Hague Draft and the Rome Convention adopted a system
based on national treatment of performers, producers, and broad-
cast organizations.49 Minimum rights were given to these protected
parties, with a single equitable remuneration to be paid to per-
formers. 50 The Rome Convention was linked to the two major in-
ternational copyright conventions, the Berne Convention51 and the
Universal Copyright Convention, 52 with membership in either be-
ing a prerequisite to joining the Rome Agreement." This was done
to promote further cooperation in the field of international copy-
right and to ensure that countries hoping to benefit from the Rome
Convention also would undertake the obligations included in the
See E. PLOMAN & L. HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 20.
48 Ulmer, The Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phono-
grams and Broadcasting Organizations (pt. 1), 10 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 91, 91 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Ulmer I].
46 Id.
4I Id.
" Id. at 92-93. During the period 1951-1960 these three factions were divided into oppos-
ing camps; the International Labor Organization preferred a clear distinction between copy-
right and neighboring rights, while the Berne Union and UNESCO wanted neighboring
rights to be an extension of copyright. E. PLOMAN & L. HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 68.
' See Rome Convention, supra note 6, art. 2(1).
"o Id. art. 12.
81 Berne Convention, supra note 27.
8 Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 41.
88 Rome Convention, supra note 6, art. 24(2).
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agreement. 4
This Convention, sometimes called the "Neighboring Rights"
Convention, provides that copyright owners will not be affected by
the recognition of performers' rights.55 Protected parties include
performers," producers, 57 and broadcast organizations.5 8 The Con-
vention, while providing a single remuneration, takes no position
on whether that remuneration is to be distributed to the perform-
ers individually or to a group which will in turn disburse proceeds
to performers." This determination is to be made in accordance
with the domestic laws of the member country."
The performer is given minimum rights of performance"' and is
protected against unconsented broadcasts of his performances.6 2 In
addition, the performer is protected from unauthorized fixation6s
of his performances, 4 thereby preventing the taping of his works
from a live performance and then sold without permission. Domes-
tic law controls areas of broadcasts to which the performer has
consented6 5 and governs the use of fixations by broadcasting orga-
nizations.68 Domestic law also regulates the disbursement of remu-
neration among performers if several performers participate in the
same performance. 7
The membership of the Rome Convention has grown steadily
during the past two decades, but still does not include the United
", Ulmer II, supra note 2, at 168.
" Rome Convention, supra note 6, art. 1. For a summary of the protection granted under
the Rome Convention, see Dittrich, The Practical Application of the Rome Convention, 26
BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'v 287 (1979).
Rome Convention, supra note 6, art. 7.
" Id. art. 10 (producers have the right to authorize reproductions of the work they
produce).
" Id. art. 13 (broadcast organizations have the right to rebroadcast their broadcasts, the
right to fixate those works, and the right to reproduce those works).
" Id. art. 12.
60 Id.
'" The performer is protected from unconsented broadcasts of his performance, uncon-
sented recordings of his performance, and any unconsented reproduction of the recording of
his performance. Id. art. 7(1).
, Id. art. 7(1)(a).
" The fixation of a work in a tangible medium of expression occurs "when its embodi-
ment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently per-
manent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981).
Rome Convention, supra note 6, art. 7(1)(c).
Id. art. 7(2)(1).
Id. art. 7(2)(2).
61 Id. art. 8.
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States.68 There have been some difficulties in arrangements of re-
muneration, 9 but these problems are administrative and do not
reflect a major flaw in the Convention's provisions. 70 The Conven-
tion is expected to grow in membership, especially in light of the
large number of countries recognizing similar rights for
performers.71
B. The Battle in the United States Over Neighboring Rights in
the 1976 Copyright Enactment
The position of the United States on neighboring rights has been
one of caution and non-conformity, highly reminiscent of its over-
all international copyright history.72 The United States Constitu-
tion extends copyright protection only to "authors. 7 3 Narrow in-
terpretations by Congress and the judiciary on the meaning of the
term "authors" have excluded musical performers 74 and have
helped prevent United States membership in the Rome
Convention.76
The non-participation of the United States in the Rome Conven-
tion is not the result of a lack of effort by the legislature.76 The
first efforts to protect performers were various bills introduced in
Congress during the 1930's.7 These bills, like further legislation
proposed during the next two decades,76 remained in committee
" See 18 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV. OF THE WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORGANIZATION (WIPO)
13 (1982) (listing Rome Convention membership).
69 See Dittrich, supra note 55, at 307.
70 Id.
71 See E. PLOMAN & L. HAMILTON, supra note 16, at 72.
72 See supra notes 14-43 and accompanying text.
73 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
74 See generally Oler, Legal Analysis, reprinted in COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 3, at 9-
12.
75 Ulmer I, supra note 45, at 99-100.
7' The House and Senate have had various bills introduced since 1936 which would have
recognized a performing artist's rights. See Lang, Performance and the Right of the Per-
forming Artist, 21 COPYRIGHT L. Symp. (ASCAP) 69, 75-80 (1974). See also Katz, supra note
3.
7 A 1936 proposal by Representative Daly would have treated the composer and per-
former as equals, with performers granted exclusive rights to public performance and dupli-
cation. See H.R. 10632, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936). A second proposal in the same year,
made by Representative Sirovich would have made performers' protection contingent upon
the written consent of the copyright owner. See H.R. 11420, 74th Cong., 2d Sees. (1936).
These proposals, as well as a Senate proposal similar to the Sirovich bill, were not acted
upon. A revised Daly bill was submitted in 1939, but met the same fate as his earlier propo-
sal. See Lang, supra note 76, at 77. See also S. 2240, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); H.R. 926,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) (texts of the 1937 and 1939 proposals, respectively).
71 See H.R. 7173, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); H.R. 1270, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947);
19831
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and did not reach the floor for a vote. 7' The judiciary attempted to
deal with performers' rights by applying the common law of unfair
competition, but the decisions did not resolve the performers'
rights issue. 80
In the early 1960's the United States Congress began to formu-
late a copyright revision to replace the Copyright Act of 1909.81
This revision gave parties interested in performers' rights, those
knowledgeable of prior judicial and legislative attempts as well as
the experience of the American Delegation at the Rome Conven-
tion,82  the opportunity to incorporate performers' rights into
H.R. 2464, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
7' Lang, supra note 76, at 77.
80 In 1937, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, deciding Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting
Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 441, 194 A. 631, 635 (1937), recognized a performer's interpreta-
tion as an artistic creation in which he had a property right:
A musical composition in itself is an incomplete work; the written page evidences
only one of the creative arts which are necessary for its enjoyment; it is the per-
former who must consummate the work by transforming it into sound. If, in so
doing, he contributes by his interpretation something of novel intellectual or artis-
tic value, he has undoubtedly participated in the creation of a product in which he
is entitled to a right of property, which in no way overlaps or duplicates that of
the author in a musical composition ....
The Court granted the plaintiff injunctive relief to prevent unauthorized broadcasts of mu-
sic when the label on the records read "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcasts." A federal dis-
trict court in North Carolina supported that position in Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 388
(E.D.N.C. 1939), a case involving the same plaintiff under similar facts. In 1940, however,
the Second Circuit rejected the Waring decisions in R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d
86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940). The court refused to recognize a prop-
erty right in the performer's creation, reasoning that any protection had been lost with pub-
lication. Id. at 88-89. The contrasting positions of the Waring and Whiteman decisions pre-
vented any judicial predictability in this area for the next thirty years. See Lang, supra note
76, at 82.
Perhaps the most thorough treatment by the judiciary of the performers' rights issue was
Judge Learned Hand's dissent in Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657,
664 (2d Cir. 1955). Although he recognized that a performer's rendition could be copy-
righted as an original arrangement or adaptation of a musical score, he feared that judicial
recognition of a performer's right based on common law principles of unfair competition
might extend those rights beyond the limited protection of the United States Constitution.
The majority in the Capitol Records case ruled that, under New York law, the sale of
records did not forfeit the performer's right in his recorded performance; however, the ma-
jority opinion did not address the fears of Judge Hand concerning perpetual monopoly. The
courts in the United States have not addressed the performers' rights issue since the Capitol
Records decision.
61 A. LATMAN, supra note 16, at 11-12.
82 The United States had been involved as a non-signatory party during the Rome Con-
vention of 1961; thus, the performers' rights issue was familiar to many copyright authori-
ties in the United States. The United States delegation at Rome "greatly promoted the
work of the Conference by its sagacious and temperate attitude." Ulmer I, supra note 45, at
99. For example, article 2 of the Rome Convention, defining "national treatment," was a
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United States copyright law. A 1965 proposal for a comprehensive
revision s3 was strongly opposed by the American Federation of
Musicians (AFM), the largest musicians' union, on the sole ground
that the proposal did not include provisions recognizing perform-
ers' rights.8 4 The AFM noted that recognition of a performers'
right in sound recordings would allow performers to economically
benefit from the performances they had made popular, 8 and that
composers, who receive royalties from airplay, were dependent
upon performers' renditions of their songs. 6 The relationship be-
tween composers and performers was seen as a musical partner-
ship, with each group making a distinct and equal contribution to-
ward the final product.8 7 The 1965 proposal did not come to the
floor for a vote; however, the House Judiciary Committee went on
record as supporting constitutional recognition of performers'
sound recordings as "writings of an author."88
Debate continued on the performers' rights issue when compre-
hensive revision bills were proposed in 1967,11 1969,90 1971,91 and
1973.92 The performers' rights movement was strongly opposed by
United States proposal. Ulmer II, supra note 2, at 169.
" H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1388-1405 (1965).
,6 Id. The AFM's position seemed to incorporate a concept developed in the American
law of unfair competition; that one should not "reap where one has not sown." See gener-
ally Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). In the case of recorded music,
a composer or copyright owner in the United States reaps all broadcast royalty benefits;
however, the recording is the result of a collaborative effort between the composer and the
performer. Since the United States copyright laws granted royalties only to the composer,
that partner was essentially reaping from the efforts of the performers. For a recent treat-
ment of this idea of unjust enrichment, see D'Onofrio, In Support of Performance Rights in
Sound Recordings, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 168, 175-76 (1981).
" See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1388-1405 (1965).
07 Id.
" H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Seas. 16-19 (1967).
" H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Seas. (1967).
0 S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
S 5. 644, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
92 S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Ses. (1973); see also H.R. 8186, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974).
Prior to the introduction of this proposed legislation, the Sound Recording Amendment of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (Oct. 15, 1971), was enacted. This amendment ex-
tended federal statutory protection to sound recordings fixed between February 15, 1972
and January 1, 1975, and for the first time, a sound recording was officially recognized as a
"writing" under the Constitution. The recognition of a copyright in a sound recording did
not, however, include a recognition of performers' rights in those recordings. The constitu-
tionality of the Sound Recording Amendment was upheld in Shaab v. Kleindienst, 345 F.
Supp. 589 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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Senator Sam Ervin, who introduced an amendment to the 1973 re-
vision bill which would have eliminated any performers' rights."
That amendment was passed in an effort to prevent the perform-
ers' rights issue from endangering the entire copyright revision,"
and Congress refused to act upon the revision measure. 5
A 1975 revision measure,6 passed in 1976,1" did not recognize
performers' rights, despite strong support for performers' rights by
the Register of Copyrights.98 In Section 114(d) of the Copyright
Act, a compromise between broadcasters and performers, 99 the
Register of Copyrights was directed to submit a report to Congress
on January 3, 1978.100 That report and its accompanying proposed
legislation,101 along with the so-called "Danielson Amendment,"10 2
have yet to be acted upon by Congress.
C. The Pending Proposals and the Renewed Interest in the
Rome Convention
Pursuant to section 114(d) of the Copyright Act of 1976,103 the
Register of Copyrights submitted her report to Congress in Janu-
ary 1978. The report concluded that a performers' sound record-
ings were "writings" under the Constitution and, therefore, were
protectable authorship. 04 The Register advocated the enactment
of a federal copyright provision, noting that the language of the
1976 general revision preempted any state protection under com-
93 S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. Amend. No. 1846 (1974).
94 See 120 CONG. REC. 30401 (1974).
" See S. REP. No. 94-1058, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The performers' strongest opposi-
tion came from broadcasting stations, which felt that payments of royalties to both perform-
ers and composers would cause them tremendous economic hardship. A. HANSON, supra
note 35, at 73. In contrast, performers and authors were the two major opposing factions in
the Rome Convention negotiations. Ulmer I, supra note 45, at 95.
" S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
•7 Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in 17
U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as Copyright Act of 1976).
"4 See Copyright Law Revision Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Comm., 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1907-09 (1975); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECOND SUPPLEMENrARY
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAw: THE 1975 REVISION BILL, chap. VIII (Oct.-Dec. 1975).
" H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
"00 See supra note 13.
1*1 43 Fed. Reg. 12,763 (1978).
.02 H.R. 6063, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
105 See supra note 13.
"04 Ringer, Summary of the Report, reprinted in CoMMrrmE PRINT, supra note 3, at 3.
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mon law.103 Protected parties would include both performers and
producers, with royalty rates to be set by the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal.106 Section 114(c)(14) of the Register's proposal would
give performers and producers at least fifty percent of all royalties
from broadcasts of sound recordings, with composers to receive the
remainder.10 7 Performers would in turn divide their share on a per
capita basis, regardless of the extent of the individual's involve-
ment in the recording session.'0 8 This proposal troubled one of the
major composer's cooperatives, which did not wish to sacrifice any
of its members' current revenues,10 9 and also one of the major per-
formers' unions, which did not give decisive support to per capita
distribution.10 Broadcasters continued to strongly oppose a per-
1o The United States Supreme Court, in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973),
held that congressional silence on this issue did not totally preempt state protection. Con-
gress had addressed this issue in the 1976 revision, which theoretically would preclude state
protection; however, not all writers accept that position. See Brown, Unification: A Cheerful
Requiem for Common Law Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1070, 1089-1106 (1977).
1 43 Fed. Reg. 12,766 (1978). The Copyright Royalty Tribunal is composed of five com-
missioners appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for seven-
year terms. 17 U.S.C. § 802 (Supp. III 1979). Their role is to make determinations of reason-
able copyright royalty rates. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1979).
107 Register's draft bill, 17 U.S.C. § 114(c)(14), reprinted in 43 Fed. Reg. 12,763, 12,767
(1978).
log Id.
BMI [Broadcast Music, Inc.] believes that performers should be fairly rewarded
for their efforts. Our concern, however, is that there be no erosion of funds already
set aside for distribution to those whom we represent. Thus, while prepared to
support legislation that will properly compensate the performer, we can do so only
if we are assured that the position of BMI writers and publishers will not be ad-
versely affected ....
COMMITrEE PRINT, supra note 3, at 452 (statement of Edward M. Cramer, Broadcast Music,
Inc.). BMI is a performing rights society which serves as a clearinghouse for performance. It
obtains from composers exclusive performing rights in a sound recording and collects royal-
ties from radio airplay. The royalty pool is then distributed to the composers who transfer
licenses to the performing rights society. J. TAUBMAN, IN TUNE WITH THE Music BUSINESS
232-33 (1980). The other major performing rights societies, the American Society of Com-
posers, Authors, and Publishers, (ASCAP), and the Society of European Stage Authors and
Composers, Inc., (SESAC), did not comment publicly on the performers' rights issue.
11 See COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 3, at 819 (statement of Sandford Wolff, American
Federation of Television and Radio Artists):
Let's say there were fifteen musicians (in addition to seven singers). That would
make twenty-two.
The fifteen musicians would get 15/22's, and the seven singers would get 7/22 in
contributions. As to how it would be divided, that remains to be seen. And I don't
think that should be an obstacle in the way of adopting the legislation. . . (em-
phasis added).
But see COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 3, at 505 (statement of Hal Davis, American Federa-
tion of Musicians) ("Each musician and/or singer on each record should receive an equal
share of the royalties allocated to performers .... " (emphasis added)).
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formers' rights amendment on economic hardship grounds111 and
also because the broadcasters felt they already generated benefits
to performers and producers through radio airplay.11' At least one
major record company advocated that it, too, should share in any
royalties given to performers and producers because of the com-
pany's involvement in "record conception, production, design,
manufacturing, distribution, marketing and promotion."'13 As a re-
sult of these differences, the Register's draft bill has not been for-
mally submitted to Congress. 1
The only other attempts to amend section 114(d) have been
made by Representative George Danielson, who introduced a "Per-
formers' Rights Amendment" in 1977,"' 1979,16 and 1981.7 The
Danielson proposal differs from the Register's draft bill in that the
Danielson Amendment provides for a mandatory 50-50 division be-
tween composers and performers," 8 while under the Register's
draft bill the performer was entitled to at least fifty percent." 9
The 1978 hearings on the Danielson Amendment'2 ° gave a great
deal of attention to possible United States participation in the
Rome Convention. During the period between 1976 and 1979, the
number of signatories to that Convention had increased from six-
See generally COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 3, at 496-588.
See Hayes, Performance Rights in Sound Recordings: How Far to the Horizon?, 9
PERF. ARTS REV. 121, 147-52 (1979).
"3 COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 3, at 570 (statement of Jerry Moss, Chairman of A. &
M. Records). Mr. Moss was also Chairman of the Board of the Recording Industry Associa-
tion of America, which came out in favor of such an arrangement. Id. at 459-69.
" The attitudes of these two groups reflect a long-standing disagreement over perform-
ers' rights. The 1930's and 1940's marked the beginning of a dispute over the performers'
rights issue as a tangential matter to the greater concern of mechanized music replacing live
musicians. For a history of the early disputes between performing rights societies (repre-
senting composers), musicians' unions, and broadcasters, see Countryman, The Organized
Musicians: H, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 239 (1948).
"16 H.R. 6063, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
16 H.R. 997, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); see also S. 1552, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)
(identical bill introduced in the Senate).
117 H.R. 1805, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as Danielson Amendment].
The sponsor changed the name of the bill from the "Performers' Rights Amendment" used
in the 1977 and 1979 proposals, to "Commercial Use of Sound Recordings Amendment" in
the 1981 proposal. The text of the 1981 draft is identical to the earlier bills.
Id. at 14-15 (proposed text of 17 U.S.C. § 114(c)(14)).
Register's draft bill, reprinted in 43 Fed. Reg. 12,763, 12,767 (1978) (proposed text of
17 U.S.C. § 114(c)(14)). Representative Danielson testified that he was not "bound" by a 50-
50 split; this would allow the possibility of composers receiving a greater share than per-
formers. See 1978 Danielson Amendment Hearings, supra note 8, at 143.
" 1978 Danielson Amendment Hearings, supra note 8, at 1-196.
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teen to twenty-three 2' and the number of countries recognizing
performers' rights by legislation had increased to fifty-four. 22
These countries had collected broadcast royalties for United States
performers, but, because of the United States lack of reciprocity,
those funds were never distributed to those performers. 23 Had
there been reciprocity arrangements, performers in the United
States would have received over $13 million in 1976 alone, 24 and
foreign artists would have received revenues from the lucrative
United States market. 125 On the other hand, composers in the
United States, because of the United States acceptance of compos-
ers' rights, are given reciprocal treatment in foreign countries and
receive royalties from foreign airplay. 26
Despite the 1979 proposal's failure to receive congressional ap-
proval, Representative Danielson reintroduced his amendment in
1981.127 Strong opposition from broadcasters 28 persuaded mem-
bers of the House subcommittee to question whether statutory
protection was necessary. 29 The Danielson Amendment remained
in committee and was not voted upon in the Ninety-seventh
Congress.
IV. THE ECONOMICS OF COMPROMISE: INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION THROUGH INTERNAL RESOLUTION
The resolution of the performers' rights issue in the United
States can take two basic courses. First, the system can remain as
it is, and section 114(d) could be drafted to prevent performers
from receiving broadcast royalties unless they are composers of the
recorded work. This would essentially grant performers the status
they had under the 1909 act and preclude United States participa-
tion in the Rome Convention. The second alternative would be to
... 1-3 UNESCO, supra note 1.
122 Id.
... 1978 Danielson Amendment Hearings, supra note 8, at 183 (statement of Louise Wie-
ner, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce for Cultural Resources).
.. Id. at 180.
121 Id. No amount was given for United States broadcasters' potential payments to for-
eign artists.
121 See Note, Performers' Rights Under the General Revision of the Copyright Law, 28
CASE W. RES. L. R. 766, 769 (1978).
1.7 See supra note 117.
118 Radio Broadcasters and Jukebox Operators are "Unalterably Opposed" to Perform-
ance Rights, PAT., TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHT J. (B.N.A.) No. 534, at A-13, A-14 (June 18,
1981).
129 Id.
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draft the statute in a way which gives performers an economic in-
terest in their work. A performer's right could take three forms: 1)
the amendment could allow performers to negotiate their broad-
cast royalties in the same way they negotiate for royalties from re-
cord sales;130 2) the amendment could follow the Register of Copy-
right's philosophy and give performers a "baseline" royalty
percentage above which the performer could negotiate;"' and 3)
the Danielson Amendment position could be taken so that the per-
former is given only a fixed percentage. 2
Each of these alternatives should satisfy United States compos-
ers, performers, and broadcasters, and, at the same time, open the
door for United States participation in the Rome Convention. The
issue in the United States is one of economics; however, economic
interests have influenced other countries in their resolution of
neighboring rights.133 By analyzing the concerns of domestic inter-
ests, and comparing domestic proposals to current foreign systems,
certain models emerge which, if followed, could allow the United
States to join the Rome Convention.
A. Maintaining the Current System
Under the current copyright system in the United States, the
composer is compensated for radio broadcasts, but record compa-
nies and performers are not paid." 4 To maintain the current sys-
tem, section 114(d) would be drafted either to explicitly reject a
performers' right in a sound recording or retain its present form.' 35
If either of these alternatives is adopted, the status of performers
will remain as it was under the Copyright Act of 1909136 and com-
posers will continue to receive all broadcast royalties.137
Composers' royalties are generally distributed through perform-
ing rights societies such as the American Society of Composers,
M See generally J. TAUBMAN, supra note 109, at 54-65.
'31 Register's draft bill, supra note 107, at 12,767 (proposed text of 17 U.S.C. §
114(c)(14)).
M' See supra note 117.
SS "The obscure language frequently used [in this field] must not let us lose sight of the
real facts: economic interests are at stake." Chakroun, What Attitude Should the Develop-
ing Countries Adopt Following the Paris Copyright Conference, February 1969?, 115B EuR.
BROADCASTING UNION REV. 50, 54 (1969), reprinted in E. PLOMAN & L. HAMILTON, supra
note 17, at 74.
', See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 13.
,SO See supra notes 74, 76-81.
'37 See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 126, at 768-69.
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Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI),
and SESAC (formerly the Society of European Stage Authors and
Composers, Inc.), which act as clearinghouses for composers and
lyricists.138 The societies obtain rights in the work from the song-
writers and collect royalties from broadcasting stations, which are
monitored by the society to ensure proper payment. 3 9
Performing artists usually do not receive royalty payments from
sales of their recorded performances. ' Even those who can negoti-
ate for sales royalties are faced with industry insistence on terms
which defer royalties until all production costs of the sound re-
cording are recouped by the record company; such an arrangement
is usually a prerequisite to a sales royalty agreement.'' Though
the recording artist does not share in the risk of loss with the re-
cord company, the artist does bear the risk of receiving no royalty
income until the company has recouped the costs of all of the art-
ist's commercial failures within a single accounting period.142 For
those performers who receive royalties after recoupment, their in-
come is very small. Most earn less than one percent of their gross
income in this manner. 1
43
The Register of Copyright's 1978 report 4 enumerated two rea-
sons for the lack of performer income from the sales of recordings.
First, most performers do not have the bargaining power to com-
mand a percentage of sales.145 Instead, their contributions are com-
pensated in the form of union-scale wages, which constitute the
only payment they receive for their recorded works. Second, the
contractual arrangements between producers and performers are
such that the recoupment cost is high, 46 which forces those per-
formers who possess bargaining power to subsidize some costly
productions.
J3, . TAUBMAN, supra note 109, at 232.
,0, Id. at 234.
See Note, supra note 126, at 780. Only 23% of performers participating in sound re-
cordings receive royalties from sales, and three-fourths of that 23% depends on those royal-
ties for less than five percent of their yearly income. Werner, An Economic Impact Analysis
of a Proposed Change in the Copyright Law, reprinted in COMMITTE PRINT, supra note 3,
at 59.
Werner, supra note 140, at 59.
14 Note, supra note 126, at 780. For example, if an artist releases three non-profiting
records and then releases a fourth which is a hit, no royalties will be paid for the fourth
until the losses from the first three are recouped.
" Werner, supra note 140, at 62.
' See COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 3, at 1-424.
'" Werner, supra note 140, at 117.
146 Id.
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As a result of the current United States system, record compa-
nies profit from their marketed product,14 7 composers receive
broadcast royalties for airplay through federal copyright laws and
sales royalties through contracts,'" broadcasters make profits from
advertising revenues based on listener audience, which is in turn
linked to the popularity of the station's format in playing a partic-
ular style of sound recordings," 9 and over one-half of the musi-
cians in the United States earn less than $13,000 per year. 150 The
bargaining power of musicians' unions is not sufficient to protect
performers since the Lea Act151 makes it unlawful to "coerce, com-
pel, or constrain .. .a licensee . . . to accede to or impose any
restriction upon .. .production, preparation, manufacture, sale,
purchase, rental, operation, use, or maintenance . . . of a program
or programs for broadcasting.' ' 52 This prevents the musicians' un-
ions from striking, eliminating their ability to use the threat of a
work stoppage to negotiate for better terms. 5 '
Maintaining the current system is beneficial to record compa-
nies, composers, and broadcasters, but it does little for unknown
performers. Popular performers, realizing that no profits are to be
made from airplay, have taken advantage of the current system to
increase their contractual demands when signing a recording con-
tract.' 5' These expenditures have been passed on from the record
companies to the consumer, causing record prices to increase dra-
matically; 55 therefore, the current system is not beneficial for re-
cord buyers in the United States.
The current copyright law also precludes the United States from
joining the Rome Convention. Under the Convention, a participat-
ing country must grant a minimum amount of protection to per-
117 See STANDARD AND POOR'S INDUSTRY SURVEYS, supra note 9, at L-32.
14. For standard royalty provisions in the songwriter's agreement, see J. TAUBMAN, supra
note 109, at 34-35.
149 Werner, supra note 140, at 99.
160 Id. at 117.
161 Act of Apr. 16, 1946, ch. 138, 60 Stat. 89, (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 506 (1976)) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Lea Act].
12 Id. § 506(b)(2), 60 Stat. at 90.
163 See generally Note, Federal Legislation: The Lea Act: An Enactment to Proscribe
Certain Practices Affecting Broadcasting, 35 GEO. L.J. 79 (1946). The constitutionality of
the Lea Act was upheld in United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947).
164 An example would be Paul McCartney, who in 1979 signed with Columbia Records for
a guaranteed $20 million. The Blues in Vinyl, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 1979, at 67.
16 Present retail list price for a phonorecord is $8.98. In 1977, the retail list price was
$6.98. See BILLBOARD, Aug. 1, 1981, at 71.
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formers. 56 Absent such a recognition of these rights in the United
States, the Rome Convention would be denied the much desired
participation of the United States.1 57
B. The Economics of Compromise
1. Performers' Rights by Contractual Negotiation
One possible resolution of the performers' rights issue would be
to draft section 114(d) so that performers could negotiate broad-
cast royalties in the same manner as they presently negotiate for
sales royalties. The new section would expressly recognize a per-
formers' right in sound recordings, but would leave the determina-
tion of the scope of the performers' protection and the amount of
remuneration to the bargaining process. It would be expected that
performers would make individual agreements for broadcast royal-
ties with composers in exchange for the performers' renditions of
the composers' work. This would cause no economic hardship to
broadcasters nor to record companies, and would give recording
artists some benefits from the performance of their works.
The drawbacks to this arrangement are two-fold. First, it does
not give all performers a guaranteed percentage for their work.
Under article 3(a) of the Rome Convention, the term "performers"
includes anyone who participates in the literary or artistic work.' 58
The article does not contemplate a distinction between performers
in the amount of protection they receive. Article 26 mandates that
participating countries are to adopt the measures necessary to en-
sure the application of the Rome Convention; 59 without statutory
protection for all performers, the United States could not satisfy
this requirement. Also, a system of contractual negotiation would
probably be unsatisfactory to domestic factions because many of
the same difficulties in the current system would recur; for in-
stance, popular performers would be able to bargain for economic
gain, leaving little for the other participants. A second drawback to
a system of contractual negotiation is that there would seem to be
i"' Rome Convention, supra note 6, art. 7.
157 In preparing her 1978 report, the Register of Copyrights consulted with experts from
various countries on the issue of neighboring rights. Representatives from Denmark, Aus-
tria, and West Germany all enthusiastically approved of the United States participation in
the Rome Convention. Oler, Performance Rights in Foreign Countries, reprinted in COM-
MIlrEE PRINT, supra note 3, at 178, 185, 188, 199.
"8 Rome Convention, supra note 6, art. 3(a).
Id. art. 26.
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no incentive for composers to relinquish the four cents per play
they now enjoy'60 to little-known performers who are a greater risk
in the marketplace. Therefore, the only performers who would ben-
efit from this arrangement are those who really do not need broad-
cast royalties.
The rights of composers in the United States are protected by
federal statute rather than the free marketplace."' This is done to
give composers control over copies of their work and to prevent
others from reaping the fruits of the composer's labors. Given the
great amount of broadcast facilities worldwide, a composer could
not possibly monitor the radio airwaves to prevent unauthorized
versions of his composition from being played."e2 This has led to
the emergence of performing rights societies such as ASCAP and
BMI, which provide those services to the composer.16 3 Only by
such a cooperative effort can broadcasting, a "public good,"'16 be
monitored.
The Lea Act and the absence of bargaining power through the
threat of strike'0 5 makes the performer's situation much like that
of the composer. Performers in the United States do not have the
strength, either individually or collectively through labor unions, to
bargain for objectives to protect their economic status. 66 Compos-
ers, being in the noncompetitive market of musical performance
rights, need public regulation to establish a satisfactory price for
those rights. 67 Since the performer is a vital part of the creative
process which produces a sound recording, there is no reason why
the performer should, unlike the composer, be subject to the free
160 See Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Ad-
ministration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 121
(1981) (Report of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal).
61 See H. HENN, COPYRIGHT PRIMER 204-06 (1979).
162 J. TAUBMAN, supra note 109, at 232.
163 The broadcast licensing mechanisms of ASCAP and BMI were upheld in a recent anti-
trust suit. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
I A "public good" is a class of goods "[wlherein the amount of use of the good or service
by one person does not reduce the amount available to others if the good has been pro-
duced. Classic examples are melodies, poems, ideas, and theories. Anyone can use them
without in any way reducing someone else's supply." A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE
AND PRODUCTION THEORY IN USE 251 (1969), reprinted in E. KrrcH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL
REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 48 (1979).
See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
'"See Gorman, The Recording Musician and Union Power: A Case Study of the Ameri-
can Federation of Musicians, reprinted in COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 3, at 1085.
'" Cirace, C.B.S. v. ASCAP: An Economic Analysis of a Political Problem, 47 FORDHAM
L. REV. 277, 277 (1978).
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market.
2. A "Minimum Rights" Statute
Section 114(d) could be drafted to assure the performer of a
minimum broadcast royalty percentage over which he could negoti-
ate for additional compensation. This "minimum rights" statute
would be similar to the Register's proposal, which guaranteed per-
formers at least 50% of broadcast royalties, 68 but would not nec-
essarily have to adopt that percentage as a minimum remunera-
tion. Though this arrangement might persuade popular performers
to reduce their demands on sales royalties and, consequently, re-
duce costs to consumers, there would be substantial administrative
costs in maintaining files on all performers and composers of all
sound recordings who individually have negotiated different per-
centages for different songs."6 9
A collective mechanism is as necessary for performers as it is for
composers. If radio stations were to contract with individual com-
posers there would be enormous transaction costs. 170  Similar
problems would develop with performers under a minimum rights
statute regarding the number of transactions and the varying
terms of those individual contracts. Administrative costs would be
significant for a performers' rights society because of the large
number of royalty recipients and the costs of monitoring a large
number of broadcast facilities;171 an increased amount of adminis-
trative time devoted to individual calculations and disbursements
would drive those costs past the point of maximum efficiency.1 72
I's See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
'69 There has been concern that the increased amount of calculations brought about by
performers' rights will cause increased transaction costs for both composers and performers.
See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 506 (1967) (statement of Sidney A. Diamond).
170 Cirace, supra note 167, at 293.
'7 See supra note 169.
17 The economic section of the 1978 Report of the Register of Copyrights put forth three
administrative systems to handle disbursements to performers. Under the "parallel system"
the performers' and record companies' disbursement group would duplicate the functions of
composers' groups such as ASCAP and BMI. Considering that the 1976 combined expendi-
tures of ASCAP and BMI totalled over $24 million, and the total amount that would have
been generated for performers in that year was $15.4 million, this system is not cost-justi-
fied. The report pointed out that ASCAP and BMI negotiated with artists for the societies'
fees, while the performers' rights society would have a fixed fee; therefore, the new society
would not have negotiation costs. However, under a minimum rights proposal, there would
be enough added costs in maintaining records and disbursements to possibly nullify the
advantage of a fixed fee.
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A minimum rights statute, however, would satisfy the require-
ments of the Rome Convention. Performers would have the protec-
tion required by article 7173 and, more importantly, any arrange-
ments for negotiation beyond the minimum amount would seem to
be permissible under article 8.174 Nevertheless, no country which
recognizes neighboring rights seems to have such a system.171
Though Rome Convention participation might be facilitated
with the passage of a minimum rights statute, the administrative
costs of such a system make it doubtful that American composers,
performers, and broadcasters would agree to such an arrangement.
For example, the high costs of maintaining information on a large
orchestra would possibly deplete the royalties set aside for that
group. Though negotiation for royalties above a fixed amount
would allow featured performers to get a larger share in recogni-
tion of their contribution to the work, it is doubtful that many
others would receive more than the set royalty rate. Under this
system, the rich probably would get richer, but those who are not
in a position to bargain for large revenues would have at least a
statutory guarantee of some royalty payments. The system would
work in theory; but as a practical matter, the high administrative
costs would tend to diminish any return to performers.
The "augmented system" would reduce administrative costs by a cooperative effort be-
tween one or both of the composers' societies and the new performers' organization. The
incentive for ASCAP and BMI to cooperate is to share the burdens of monitoring in order
to reduce their own expenses. As a practical matter, obtaining cooperation could be difficult
since BMI feels that its members are competitors with performers for royalty payments. In
addition, this system would require structural changes in ASCAP and BMI concerning their
monitoring and data collection, and there is no indication that these groups are willing to
change their long-established practices.
The "substitute system" would have the new performers' society take over ASCAP's and
BMI's role on information collection, and have broadcasters put on a self-reporting basis.
The society would then charge ASCAP and BMI for information concerning broadcaster
use. This system is probably the least practical of the three: in addition to the dubious
possibility of ASCAP and BMI stepping aside to allow the new group to become the central
clearinghouse, the "substitute system" relies on advances in technology to be able to moni-
tor tapes submitted by broadcasters. These tapes would be similar to the present "spot-
check" arrangements, currently performed by BMI, which requires broadcasters to submit a
log for all music played during a chosen week of the year. The combination of this new
reporting system, the new technology necessary to implement it, and the unrealistic pros-
pect of ASCAP and BMI merging into a performers' society, makes the "substitute system"
unworkable at the present time. See Werner, supra note 140, at 107-10.
, See supra note 61.
'7 Domestic law may specify the manner in which performers are represented in connec-
tion with the exercise of their rights. Rome Convention, supra note 6, art. 8.
M See generally Oler, supra note 3, at 331-67.
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3. A "Fixed Rights" Statute
Section 114(d) could be drafted to give composers and perform-
ers a set royalty percentage, with the performers' share to be di-
vided on a per capita basis. Such a "fixed rights" statute has been
proposed in the Danielson Amendment.'76 Under that proposal,
the administrative costs of the "minimum rights" statute would be
avoided, and superstars would not be able to use their bargaining
power in broadcast royalties as they have in sales royalties. A par-
allel system, under which an independent performing rights society
would be created to represent performers only, could be economi-
cally feasible in the absence of negotiation costs and the adminis-
trative costs of recordkeeping. Both costs would be eliminated
under a fixed right/parallel system arrangement since the percent-
age rate would be fixed.
The per capita division proposal in the Danielson Amendment is
not necessary for United States participation in the Rome Conven-
tion. One of the Convention's participants, Denmark, calculates
royalties on the basis of "points" which are accumulated according
to the amount of participation of each performer.'77 A soloist, for
example, receives ten points for his contribution in a sound record-
ing, while lesser points are given to the soloist when there is an
accompanist. The Danish model includes point variations for
orchestras, ensembles and choirs in various combinations. A per-
former's total payment is then calculated by multiplying his points
by a uniform point value. 7 ' Royalties are collected from broad-
casting organizations by GRAMEX, the Danish performing rights'
society, and distributed to the individual performers. GRAMEX
operates in conjunction with KODA, the Danish counterpart of
ASCAP and BMI, to collect data on broadcasts. This cooperation
has eliminated high costs of administration; the costs of adminis-
tering the GRAMEX fund in 1975 did not exceed nine percent of
the total fees collected.' 79
In Austria, similar calculations of performers' royalties are made
by the Wahrnehmung von Leistungsschultzrechten Gesellschaft,
1 See Danielson Amendment, supra note 117, § 114(c)(14), at 14-15.
' Law No. 158 of 1961 on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works, § 47 (Den.)
(amended 1977) (Danish Ministry of Educ. transl. 1977), reprinted in 1 UNESCO, Copy-
RIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (Supp. 1978), is the source of performers' rights in
Danish law. The point valuation for performers is not statutory, but is found in GRAMEX
regulations. See Oler, supra note 3, at 178, 183.
17" Oler, supra note 3, at 178, 183.
17 Id. at 183.
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m.b.H. (LSG), which bases its payments to performers on air
time.180 Like most Rome Convention countriess18 Austrian produc-
ers and performers share equally in royalty payments.""s LSG, like
the Danish system, has very low administrative costs.'
The Federal Republic of Germany does not calculate royalties on
a point system, but instead on the basis of each individual's re-
cording-related earnings from the previous year."8 ' Gesellschaft zur
Verwertung von Leistungsschultzrechten m.g.H. (GVL), the Ger-
man performing rights society, administers a fund into which per-
formers pay a percentage of their earnings. Unlike other Western
countries, the performers are granted sixty-four percent of the net
distributable revenue, while producers are given a subsidiary right
to thirty-six percent. 8 5
Perhaps the most interesting system of Rome Convention coun-
tries is Brazil's, which has undergone a dramatic change in its sys-
tem's administration during the last decade.18 6 Prior to 1973, the
Sociedad Brasiliera de Interpretes e Produtores Fonographicas
(SOCINPRO) acted as a performing rights society and distributed
funds to performers and producers. Two-thirds of the performers'
share was to go to the featured performer, and the remaining one-
third was to be divided per capita among the remaining perform-
ers. 8 7 Administrative costs as high as fifty to sixty percent caused
180 Id. at 187.
183 See id. at 331-67.
Federal Act on Copyright in Works of Literature and Art and on Related Rights (Cop-
yright Act), § 76, 1936 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] 131 (Aus.) (amended 1949, 1953, 1972, and
1980) (Permanent Delegation of Aus. for UNESCO transl. 1980), reprinted in 1 UNESCO,
supra note 177.
388 LSG collects a lump sum payment from Oesterreichische Rundfunk Gesellschaft
m.b.H. (ORF), which is Austria's only broadcasting corporation. Administrative costs from
this collection are around 10% of collected fees. Oler, supra note 3, at 178, 186-87.
'" An Act dealing with Copyright and Related Rights, art. 7, 1965 Bundesgesetzblatt
[BGBI] 1 1273 (W. Ger.) (amended 1969, 1970, 1972, 1973 and 1974) [hereinafter cited as
West German Copyright Statute], reprinted in 2 UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES
OF THE WORLD (Supp. 1978); see also Oler, supra note 3, at 178, 197 (scale of fees set by the
German Orchestra Association). The collecting society is to determine fees in regard to "re-
ligious, cultural, and social interest of the persons liable to pay remuneration, including
youth welfare interests." West German Copyright Statute, supra, art. 13, reprinted in 2
UNESCO, supra. The West German Copyright Law is said to have "tackle[d] the modern
realities brought about by technological advancement." E. PLOMAN & L. HAMILTON, Supra
note 17, at 113.
'm See Oler, supra note 3, at 178, 197.
' Id. at 222-25.
387 Id. at 223, citing Leduc, National Applications of the Rome Convention on Neighbor-
ing Rights, 8 COPYRIGHT 232 (1972).
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the Brazilian National Copyright Council to suspend SOCINPRO's
collection activities and to replace it with the Escritorio Central de
Arrecadacao e Distribuicao (ECAD), a government agency which
cannot, under Brazilian law, deduct more than twenty percent of
the total fund for administrative costs- 8
The Danish, Austrian, West German, and Brazilian systems give
the United States four models upon which to structure an alterna-
tive to the pure per capita distribution scheme proposed in the
Danielson Amendment. The administrative costs of these systems
have been reduced in great part by a cooperative effort between
those countries' collecting societies. To enjoy the same success, AS-
CAP and BMI must work closely with a performing rights society
in the United States.
Once it is established that this system is cost-justified for per-
formers, the next step of analysis must be the impact that such an
arrangement will have on United States broadcasters. The Regis-
ter's report in 1978 concluded that the economic fears of radio
broadcasters were unjustified since those broadcasters would be
able to pass on the costs of their operations to advertising spon-
sors. 189 The report noted that the broadcast industry in the United
States does not function like a "competitive, profit-maximizing,
cost-minimizing market";1 90 instead, the income of owners is gener-
ated in ways other than dividends from profits.1 Those stations
which suffer "losses" have high expenses, including salaries to own-
ers and managers, 92 which help divert station profits into personal
profits.'93 Many stations which reported losses over long periods of
time remained in the industry, 194 which does not coincide with the
usual fate of businesses operating at a deficit.
An increase in royalty rates as a result of a performers' right
would be passed on primarily by stations to advertisers without a
significant loss of advertising revenues. 9 5 The Register's report
I" See Oler, supra note 3, at 178, 224, citing Chaves, News from Brazil, 93 REVUE INTER-
NATIONALE Du DROIT D'AurrEuR 58, 66 (1977). Escritorio Central de Arrecadacao e Distribui-
cao (ECAD), was promulgated by a major revision in the Brazilian copyright laws in 1973
which dealt with the administration of the country's copyright system. See DIARIo OFICIAL
[D.O.] art. 117(vi) (Braz. 1973), reprinted in 1 UNESCO, supra note 177.
I Werner, supra note 140, at 98.
1"0 Id. at 97.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 91.
193 Id.
I" Id. at 88.
195 Id. at 100.
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concluded that the demand for radio advertising is relatively in-
sensitive to price fluctuations, 9 ' and, therefore, the broadcasters
would not suffer economically. The broadcasting industry seems to
be composed of members who are able to withstand losses without
going off the air; certainly the expenses of performers' royalties
could be absorbed without dire consequences.
The effect of a fixed royalty statute for performers may be bene-
ficial to record buyers. The Consumer Federation of America fa-
vors the grant of a performers' right in sound recordings because
the price of a record includes costs for the creation and production
of sound recordings, and these costs should be absorbed by broad-
casters. 97 In light of the large contracts which major artists now
command, 98 record prices may decline. Record companies would
no longer be the sole royalty supporter of the artist, and broadcast-
ers would merely pass on their increased costs to advertisers. The
fixed rights statute therefore would do the most good with the
least possible damage to any of the interested parties. Most impor-
tantly, it would facilitate participation of the United States in the
Rome Convention.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States history in the field of international copyright
has been one of non-cooperation and non-participation with for-
eign countries. After rejecting the Berne Convention for over half a
century, the United States finally entered into a major multilateral
copyright convention, the Universal Copyright Convention, in the
1950's.
This international cooperation by the United States has not ex-
tended to the area of neighboring rights in sound recordings. Dur-
ing the 1960's, a major international convention dealing with
neighboring rights entered into force. This agreement, the Rome
Convention, includes twenty-four countries; the United States,
however, is not a member. This is largely due to the United States
treatment of copyright as the sole property of the initial creator
and not the property of the performer,' 9 resulting in a dichotomy
between the United States position and the positions of the major-
19 Id.
'" COMMITrEE PINr, supra note 3, at 599 (comment letter of Kathleen F. O'Reilly, Exec-
utive Director, Consumer Federation of America).
" See supra note 154.
" See supra note 23.
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ity of the world's non-socialist countries. The history of the United
States prior to its accession to the Universal Copyright Convention
might be repeated as it continues to reject a major multilateral in-
ternational copyright convention.
To join the Rome Convention, the United States must seek a
compromise between domestic broadcasters, composers, and per-
formers, whose actions threaten continued non-participation. The
compromise must recognize performers' rights in sound recordings,
a prerequisite to Rome Convention membership, and yet satisfy
these domestic factions. The resolution of this issue continues to
be beyond the reach of the United States Congress; therefore,
significant financial benefits remain beyond the reach of deserving
foreign and domestic performers.
Eric T. Johnson

